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Abstract—Security in wireless sensor networks is critical due
to its way of open communication. Packet modiﬁcation is a
common attack in wireless sensor networks. In literature, many
schemes have been proposed to mitigate such an attack but
very few detect the malicious nodes effectively. In the proposed
approach, each node chooses the parent node for forwarding the
packet towards sink. Each node adds its identity and trust on
parent as a routing path marker and encrypts only the bytes
added by node in packet before forwarding to parent. Sink can
determine the modiﬁers based on trust value and node identities
marked in packet. Child node observes the parent and decides the
trust on parent based on successful and unsuccessful transactions.
Data transmission is divided into multiple rounds of equal time
duration. Each node chooses the parent node at the beginning
of a round based on its own observation on parent. Simulated
the algorithm in NS-3 and performance analysis is discussed.
With the combination of trust factor and ﬁxed path routing to
detect malicious activity, analytical results show that proposed
method detect modiﬁers efﬁciently and early, and also with low
percentage of false detection.
Keywords—WSN, trust based, malicious node, packet modiﬁca-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially
distributed autonomous devices having sensing, computing
and communication capabilities. Sensor nodes cooperatively
monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temper-
ature, pressure, sound, vibration, motion or pollutants. Wireless
sensor networks are used in environmental conditions where
information is difﬁcult to access. Sensor node, also known as
a ’mote’, is a node in a wireless sensor network that is capable
of performing some processing, gathering sensory information
and communicating with other connected nodes in the network.
Sensor network transmits the data from one node to another
node in an adhoc way and ﬁnally to a base station where the
data is stored, processed and displayed.
Sensor nodes are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [1].
Attacker can listen to radio transmissions, inject false data
in the channel, replay previously heard packets to drain the
energy of other nodes as battery power is crucial in nodes.
Attacker may deploy few malicious nodes with similar or better
hardware capabilities or by ’turning’ few legitimate nodes
by capturing them and physically overwriting their memory.
Packet dropping and modiﬁcation is a basic problem which
has large impact on the information gathered by sensor nodes
as network loses lot of important sensed data. Cryptography
techniques alone are not sufﬁcient to protect the data. Attacks
such as wormhole, rushing attacks can be launched without
the help of cryptography keys [2].
In this paper, we propose simple yet effective scheme
’Catching Packet Modiﬁers with Trust Support (CPMTS)’ to
identify packet modiﬁers. After deployment, each node selects
a list of parent nodes which have equal and shortest distance to
sink node. Each node choose a parent node among the selected
parent nodes and sends parent selection information to sink.
Sink establishes a routing tree rooted at sink node based on
the information received from each node. Data transmission
is divided into rounds of equal time duration. Each node
chooses a different parent node in the beginning of a round or
phase among the selected parents. Intermediate node prepares
marker data containing node identity and trust factor on its
parent node, encrypts the marker data and adds to the packet
before forwarding the packet to parent node. Marker data
added by each node helps sink to trace the nodes in the
routing path. Sink ﬁnds a pair of nodes which are responsible
for packet modiﬁcation during packet decryption process if
packet decryption fails and uses the trust value to ﬁlter the
malicious node among the pairs. Sink uses aggregated trust
value collected by each child node on parent to avoid bad
mouthing attack.
In order to ﬁnd the packet modiﬁers and droppers, Catching
Packet Droppers and Modiﬁers(CPDM) [3] has been proposed
recently in literature. But CPDM frames the source node even
the intermediate node drops or modiﬁes the packet and the
percentage of false isolation is high. We provide a theoretical
performance analysis showing the comparison between the
CPDM and our approach with various parameters. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows, section 2 discusses about the
related work, section 3 describes the problem statement, sec-
tion 4 presents the solution and algorithm, section 5 provides
the performance analysis and results, and section 6 concludes
the work and discusses the future challenges.
II. RELATED WORK
To handle the packet droppers and modiﬁers, multi-path
routing [4], [5], [6], [7] approach is widely adopted in which
copies of a packet are forwarded along multiple paths to the
destination sink. Neighbor node observation or monitoring is
another approach [8], [9], [10] used to ﬁnd the packet mod-
iﬁers, droppers and routing misbehavior in sensor networks.
In monitoring approach, nodes monitor their neighborhoods




identify the malicious activity and take future forwarding
decisions. Monitoring method requires nodes to buffer the
packets which are forwarded to next hope node and compares
the packet forwarded by next hop node with its buffered
packet to ﬁnd out packet modiﬁcations. Energy consumption
in both multi-path routing and neighborhood monitoring is not
affordable for sensor networks. In [2], energy efﬁcient sleep-
wake approach along with local monitoring method is used
to detect malicious nodes. CPDM [3] proposed a scheme to
detect packet modiﬁers and droppers without using multi-path
forwarding or monitoring approach, but the method identify
the malicious nodes after long time operation of network and
also has high false positive detection.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Goal of the proposed CPMTS method is to identify the
packet modiﬁers in the wireless sensor networks by sink
node while processing the data packet. Sink node starts with
decryption of the packet with pair wise keys shared with
nodes which are in the packet forwarding path. The decryption
happens with the shared keys in the reverse order of nodes
in the forwarding path from sink node to source node. Since
each node adds the marker information and encrypts the added
information, there are two possibilities for packet modiﬁcation.
case i) received packet is ﬁrst modiﬁed before adding and
encrypting the marker data, case ii) packet is modiﬁed after
adding marker data and before forwarding the packet.
Fig. 1. Deployment and Topology
In ﬁgure 1, either node Y modiﬁes the packet before
sending to node X as in case ii or node X modiﬁes the received
packet before adding marker and forwarding further. Problem
is to ﬁnd the actual modiﬁer between the pair of < X, Y >
nodes which are equally suspected for packet modiﬁcation.
System Assumptions: CPMTS assumes the network is
static and the links are bidirectional. CPMTS assumes that
pair wise keys are shared between sink and each network
node before deployment. Assumed no malicious activity during
topology creation. In CPMTS each node knows the current
(X,Y) location and also the location of the neighbor nodes. Ma-
licious behavior is manifested through misrouting or modifying
packets. Source nodes are assumed to be genuine. Assumed
that parent node adjusts the transmission power level such that
child node hears the packet transmitted by parent.
IV. CPMTS
The proposed method has several steps of operation.
CPMTS starts with creating a network topology, selecting
parent node, generation of trafﬁc, and identifying the malicious
nodes by sink.
A. Topology Creation
Sink node starts with sending a tuple < node ID, distance
to sink > = < S, 0 > to all the one hop neighbor nodes. On
receiving a tuple < u, du > = < S, 0 > where u is the node
id and du is the distance to sink from node u, node X records
its distance to sink as du+1. If du+1 is less than the distance
information node X has seen, then clears all the recorded parent
list and adds node u to parent list and update the distance info
to du+1. If du+1 is equal to the distance information node X
has, then adds the node u to parent list. Intern node X sends
a tuple < X, du+1 > to all its neighbor nodes.
Once all distance information is processed, every node
contains smallest distance to the sink node and also parent
nodes list through which sink can be reached with equal and
least distance. Each node selects a parent among the recorded
parents for transmitting the data to sink. Each node V picks
a random number Vs in the range 0 to Np where Np is the
maximum number of parents recorded and uses the random
number Vs as a short id of node V. Each node sends its ID,
short id, selected parent node ID, and recorded parents list to
sink node. Based on the information received from each node,
sink builds a tree topology with all parent-child relations and
uses this relations for step by step data decryption and for
ﬁnding the malicious nodes.
B. Trafﬁc Generation and forwarding
When a source node Z has data to send, node Z creates
a message m1 = < Zs, Z, Ty , Zseq , D > and encrypts the
message m1 with Zkey to generate mz . Where Zs is the short
ID of node Z, Z is ID of node, Ty is node Z’s trust value on
parent Y, Zseq is the sequence number of the packet, D is the
data generated from source node Z, and Zkey is the key shared
with Sink. Node Z sends the message mz to parent Y, Y being
intermediate node prepares marker information < Ys, Tx >
and encrypts with Ykey to create m2, where Ys is the short
id of node Y, Tx is the node Y’s trust value on parent X, and
Ykey is the key shared with Sink. Node Y creates message my
= < m2, mz > by adding encrypted marker information to
mz . similarly all forwarding node’s adds the encrypted marker
information to the packet.
C. Packet Processing at Sink
The received packet at the sink consists of sequence
of marker information added by each forwarding node and
message from source node. On receiving a data packet m, sink
starts decryption of the packet.
i) First marker information of message m is decrypted with





starts with < Xs, Ts > then X is the forwarded node. Else
sink decrypts with key of next immediate ﬁrst level child node
and tries to match the marker information.
???
ii) If marker information does not match with any of the
ﬁrst level children, then sink decrypts the complete message





with < Xs, X > then X is the source node. Else sink decrypts
with key of next ﬁrst level child node and tries to check for
source.







- < Xs, Ts > by removing the marker added
by X. Now the step i and step ii are performed for all children
of X to match for forwarding node or source node.
iv) if step i and step ii fails for all children nodes at same
level, that conﬁrms the packet modiﬁcation either from current
parent or any child of the current parent. So the suspicious pair
< parent, child > is added to suspicious list for all immediate
children nodes of the parent. The malicious node is identiﬁed
from suspicious pairs with the help of trust value recorded for
each node. During the success of step i and step ii, sink records
the trust value shared by child on its parent.
Notations:
m: received packet at sink
U, V, S: node id
Vkey: shared key between sink and node V
Vs: short id of node V
success: boolean to track successful decryption
Algorithm 1: Packet Processing at Sink
1: Input: Packet <m>
2: U = S, m = m; success = false;
3: for each child node V of node U do
4: P = decMarker(Vkey , m); /*decrypts only marker which
is two units*/
5: if P starts with [Vs, T] then
6: record the T on U from V;
7: trim [Vs, T] from P and get m = P-[Vs, T];
8: U = V; go to line 3;
9: else
10: continue;
11: for each child node V of node U do
12: P = decSourceMsg(Vkey , m); /*decrypts source message
which is ﬁve units*/
13: if P starts with [Vs, V] then /*V is the source node*/
14: record the T on U from V;
15: success = true; break;
16: if success = false then
17: drop this packet;
18: for each child node V of node U do
19: add suspicious pair <U, V> to suspicious list;
D. Identifying Malicious Node
After a round of trafﬁc generation, sink has a list of
suspicious pair < Parent node, Child Node > of nodes and also
trust on a parent from their child nodes. For each parent node
sink does the below. i) Calculate the average trust based on the
trust value received from each child. If average trust value is
less than the threshold, then Parent node is the malicious node.
ii) If average Trust value is greater than the threshold then ﬁnd
a child whose average trust value less than the threshold. If
such a child is found, then child is the malicious node. iii) If
average trust values of both parent and children are greater than
threshold then they are still suspicious pairs but not malicious
yet.
E. Changing Parent For Next Round
Trafﬁc generation happens in several equal duration rounds
of malicious node identiﬁcation phases. After a round, child
chooses a parent as per the below priority. Even sink follows
the same priority to know parent based on the parents list
sent by child. i) Child chooses the next parent in its list with
which it never had an interaction. ii) Child chooses the parent
for which trust value is high.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The efﬁciency and effectiveness of CPMTS are evaluated
in NS-3 simulator. We have compared proposed approach with
CPDM [3]. 100 nodes are randomly deployed in a square area.
Non leaf nodes are randomly selected as malicious nodes. All
nodes act as a source node and generate the data to forward
towards sink. Obtained simulation results from the algorithm
for various number of malicious nodes. Malicious behavior of
nodes achieved with equal probability of packet modiﬁcation
and success transmission.
A. Percentage of Detection
Simulated and analyzed the detection rate when the number
of malicious nodes are 10, 20, 30, and 40.
% detection = (No. of malicious nodes detected / No. of
malicious nodes in network)*100
Fig. 2. Percentage of malicious node detection
For each quantity of malicious nodes, trafﬁc is generated in
5 trails and averaged the detected malicious nodes in 5 trails.
As shown in ﬁgure 2, percentage of detection is improved
in CPMTS when compare to CPDM approach. In CPDM, the
percentage of detection deteriorates as the number of malicious
nodes increases.
B. Percentage of False Isolation
Simulated and analyzed the false detection when the num-
ber of malicious nodes are 10, 20, 30, and 40.
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Fig. 3. Percentage of false isolation
% false detection = (No. of genuine nodes isolated / No.
of genuine nodes in network)*100
As shown in ﬁgure 3, percentage of false detection is high
in CPDM approach. IN CPDM approach, even though interme-
diate node modiﬁes the packet, sink considers the source node
for malicious detection. In proposed approach, only the current
parent and children where the packet decryption fails are
considered for identifying the malicious node. And considered
trust from all children node to avoid bad mouth attack from
a particular child which tries to frame the parent as malicious
by sending low trust value to Sink.
C. Early Detection Rate
Simulated and analyzed the early detection when the num-
ber of malicious nodes are 20. In both CPDM and CPMTS,
trafﬁc is generated in multiple rounds of equal duration and
tries to ﬁnd the malicious nodes after each round. CPDM needs
several rounds of operation to conﬁrm the bad nodes among
suspiciously bad nodes. CPDM cannot detect most bad nodes
after each round as it suspects many nodes on the path from
source to sink.
Fig. 4. Early Detection Rate
As shown in ﬁgure 4, CPMTS detects the malicious nodes
early compare to CPDM, so that network cannot afford to loose
lot of meaningful information before all malicious nodes are
detected.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Packet modiﬁcation is a usual security attack to disrupt
the data in wireless sensor networks. Proposed method is
proven to be efﬁcient to detect packet modiﬁers compare to
CPDM approach. CPMTS starts with creating a tree topology
having parent-child relation information in Sink node. Data
transmission happen across multiple rounds of equal time
duration. Each node chooses its parent node at the beginning
of a round. CPDM identiﬁes few bad nodes after each round
and keeps suspiciously bad nodes till the completion of all
rounds. At the end of all rounds, CPDM tries to ﬁnd the
bad nodes from suspiciously bad nodes. But CPMTS adds
suspiciously bad nodes during each packet decryption process
if packet decryption fails and identiﬁes the most bad nodes
after ﬁrst round. Performance results show that CPMTS detects
the malicious nodes early with high detection rate and low
false detection. CPMTS can be further improved to avoid
misrouting, black hole attack and sybil attacks.
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